

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

WAYMO LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;
OTTOMOTTO LLC; OTTO TRUCKING
LLC,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:17-cv-00939

**JOINT PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS**

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 1 Re. SUMMARY OF CONTENTIONS¹ Offered by Waymo**

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3 To help you follow the evidence, I will give you a brief summary of the positions of the
4 parties. This is an action for trade secret misappropriation relating to Waymo LLC's self-driving
5 car technology.

6 Waymo asserts that it is the owner of information relating to its self-driving car technology,
7 including its custom LIDAR systems that are used to enable the operation of fully self-driving
8 vehicles.

9 Waymo claims that this information includes nine separate trade secrets and that
10 Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Ottomotto LLC, and Otto Trucking LLC misappropriated
11 those trade secrets. "Misappropriation" means the improper acquisition, disclosure or use of the
12 trade secrets.

13 Waymo has alleged trade secret misappropriation under California law and Federal law.

14 Waymo claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking's misappropriation caused Uber,
15 Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking to be unjustly enriched.

16 Waymo also claims that it is entitled to a reasonable royalty for Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto
17 Trucking's use of Waymo's trade secrets.

18 Waymo has the burden of proving these claims.

19 Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking deny Waymo's claims.

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26 ¹ MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE NINTH CIRCUIT §1.5.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 1 Re. SUMMARY OF CONTENTIONS² Offered By Defendants**

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3 To help you follow the evidence, I will give you a brief summary of the positions of the
4 parties.

5 The parties in the case are Waymo, Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking. Waymo is the
6 plaintiff, which means Waymo filed the case. Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking are the
7 defendants.

8 You will hear about Anthony Levandowski during this trial. He is not a party in this
9 case.

10 Waymo claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking have misappropriated nine of
11 Waymo's trade secrets. I will provide you with a list of the claimed trade secrets in a few minutes.

12 Waymo claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking's misappropriation caused Uber,
13 Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking to be unjustly enriched. Waymo has the burden of proving these
14 claims.

15 Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking deny that Waymo has identified any trade secrets, or
16 that they have misappropriated any trade secrets.

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² MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
20 THE NINTH CIRCUIT §1.5.

21 **To help you follow the evidence, I will give you a brief summary of the positions of the
22 parties:**

23 **The plaintiff asserts that [plaintiff's claims]. The plaintiff has the burden of proving these
24 claims.**

25 **The defendant denies those claims [and also contends that [defendant's counterclaims
26 and/or affirmative defenses]]. [The defendant has the burden of proof on these
[counterclaims and/or affirmative defenses.]]**

27 **[The plaintiff denies [defendant's counterclaims and/or affirmative defenses].]**

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 2 Re. NUMBER OF WITNESSES³ Offered By Waymo**

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4 The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of
5 witnesses who testify. Nor does it depend on which side called witnesses or produced evidence.
6 You should base your decision on all of the evidence regardless of which party presented it.

7 You are not required to decide any issue according to the testimony of a number of
8 witnesses, which does not convince you, as against the testimony of a smaller number or other
9 evidence, which is more convincing to you. The testimony of one witness worthy of belief is
10 sufficient to prove any fact. This does not mean that you are free to disregard the testimony of any
11 witness merely from caprice or prejudice, or from a desire to favor either side. It does mean that
12 you must not decide anything by simply counting the number of witnesses who have testified on
13 the opposing sides. The test is not the number of witnesses but the convincing force of the
14 evidence.

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25 ³ MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
26 THE NINTH CIRCUIT §1.14; Modified by Case 3:10-cv-03561-WHA Document 1928 at ¶¶5, 6
27 (Oracle v. Google Final Instructions).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 2 Re. NUMBER OF WITNESSES Offered By Defendants**

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4 Uber objects to the inclusion of this general instruction as improper under the Guidelines
5 for Trial and Final Pretrial Conference in Civil Jury Cases Before The Honorable William Alsup.
6 Paragraph 2(b) of the Guidelines limits the joint set of proposed instructions to “instructions on
7 *substantive* issues of law,” and excludes preliminary, general, and concluding instructions.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 3 Re. FAILURE TO EXPLAIN OR DENY EVIDENCE⁴ Offered**

2 **By Waymo**

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4 In determining what inferences to draw from evidence you may consider, among other
5 things, a party's failure to explain or deny such evidence.
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⁴ Case 3:10-cv-03561-WHA Document 1928 at ¶9 (Oracle v. Google Final Instructions).

Disputed Instruction No. 3 Re. FAILURE TO EXPLAIN OR DENY EVIDENCE Offered

By Defendants

Uber objects to the inclusion of this general instruction as improper under the Guidelines for Trial and Final Pretrial Conference in Civil Jury Cases Before The Honorable William Alsup. Paragraph 2(b) of the Guidelines limits the joint set of proposed instructions to “instructions on substantive issues of law,” and excludes preliminary, general, and concluding instructions. Uber also objects to this instruction as reflected in the accompanying Memorandum of Law.

Disputed Instruction No. 4 Re. COMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS⁵**Offered By Waymo**

This Court issued an Order requiring Defendants Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking to return to Waymo, by no later than March 31, 2017, all documents relating to any Waymo files taken by Anthony Levandowski from Waymo. The Court's Order also required Defendants to disclose whether any of those documents had been destroyed. Defendants disobeyed that Order.

Uber and Ottomotto had in their control documents relating to the Waymo files taken by Anthony Levandowski from Waymo, but did not disclose to Waymo or the Court that these documents existed. All three Defendants also knew that other documents relating to the taken Waymo files had been destroyed, but did not disclose that to Waymo or the Court.

This Court issued a second Order requiring Defendants to return to Waymo, by no later than May 31, all documents relating to any Waymo files taken by Anthony Levandowski from Waymo. Uber and Ottomotto disobeyed that Order as well. As of the May 31 deadline, Uber and Ottomotto had in their control documents relating to files taken by Anthony Levandowski from Waymo, but did not disclose to either Waymo or the Court that these files existed.

On July 3, 2017, this Court issued a third Order, this time requiring Uber and Ottomotto's agents at the law firm of Morisson & Foerster and their consulting firm Stroz Friedberg to show "why they are not in violation of orders herein" requiring production of documents relating to Waymo files taken by Mr. Levandowski from Waymo. In response to that Order, for the first time Uber and Ottomotto's agent Morrison & Foerster revealed that it had possessed since March 2017, before the deadline of the Court's first Order, documents relating to Waymo files taken by Anthony Levandowski from Waymo. Morrison & Foerster said that it had received these documents from Uber and Ottomotto's other agent, Stroz Friedberg, which had been in possession of them since

⁵ Dkt. No. 1502.

1 March 2016. Morrison & Foerster's possession of those documents should have been disclosed in
2 response to the Court's prior Orders, and Defendants disobeyed those Orders by failing to do so.

3 In addition, as part of its first Order, this Court also required Defendants Uber, Ottomotto,
4 and Otto Trucking to provide to Waymo and the Court, by no later than June 23, a complete and
5 chronologically organized log of all oral and written communications – including meetings, phone
6 calls, emails, and text messages – in which Anthony Levandowski discussed LiDAR with any of
7 Defendants' employees. Defendants disobeyed that Order too. As of the June 23 deadline,
8 Defendants failed to disclose the existence of hundreds of communications between Defendants
9 and Mr. Levandowski relating to LiDAR that Defendants knew or should have known existed.

10 Finally, on August 22, 2017, Uber and Ottomotto's agent Stroz Friedberg revealed for the
11 first time that it was storing [REDACTED]
12 from Mr. Levandowski that should have been disclosed much earlier. This late disclosure violated
13 the Court's prior Orders and the information should have been disclosed in response to the Court's
14 July 3, 2017 Order.

15 In determining the trustworthiness of Defendants' witnesses, attorneys, and agents, you
16 may, but are not required to, consider the fact that Defendants and their agents disobeyed these
17 Court Orders to disclose the existence and destruction of documents relating to Waymo files that
18 Anthony Levandowski took from Waymo and to disclose the existence of communications
19 between Mr. Levandowski and Defendants' employees relating to LiDAR.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 4 Re. COMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS Offered By**

2 **Defendants**

3 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 5 Re. FIFTH AMENDMENT⁶ Offered By Waymo**

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3 During the testimony of Mr. Levandowski, you heard him invoke his Fifth Amendment
4 privileges.

5 You may, but are not required to, draw adverse inferences based on his assertion of his
6 Fifth Amendment privilege.

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25 ⁶ Dkt. 1535 (modified) (“As the undersigned judge explained during a hearing on July 26 (*see*
26 Dkt. No. 1050 at 99:1–13), the jury will be instructed, if the Fifth Amendment is invoked, that it
27 may, but is not required to, draw inferences adverse to *Levandowski* based on his assertion of his
28 Fifth Amendment privilege. If any such adverse inference is drawn against Levandowski, then it
 will remain up to the jury to decide, as a separate question and based on all the other evidence in
 the case, whether the fact inferred is also adverse to one or more parties herein.”)

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 5 Re. FIFTH AMENDMENT⁷ Offered By Uber/Ottomotto**

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3 Every citizen has a right under our Constitution to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to
 4 avoid furnishing evidence that might be used against him in a later criminal prosecution. There are
 5 sometimes reasons that a person who is not guilty of a crime may invoke the Fifth Amendment,
 6 and therefore the mere fact that the person invokes the right does not necessarily mean the person
 7 is guilty of a crime.

8 You have heard evidence that Anthony Levandowski invoked his Fifth Amendment right
 9 against self-incrimination as a basis for refusing to testify about anything that occurred from the
 10 time he started working for Google in 2007 to the present. Mr. Levandowski is not a party to this
 11 case, but he is a witness in this case. So long as it is reasonable and supported by the evidence,
 12 you are permitted to assume, but are not required to assume, that if Mr. Levandowski testified, his
 13 testimony would have been unfavorable to Mr. Levandowski.

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17 ⁷ 7/26/2017 Hr'g Tr. 98:24–100:8, Dkt. 1050; Dkt. 1535; *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); *Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer*, 232 F.3d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000); *Lefkowitz v. Turley*, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); *Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Ed.*, 350 U.S. 551, 557–58, (1956); *Grunewald v. United States*, 353 U.S. 391, 421–22 (1957); *Ohio v. Reiner*, 532 U.S. 17, 20 (2001); *Ullmann v. United States*, 350 U.S. 422, 426–27 (1956); *Lionti v. Lloyd's Ins. Co.*, 709 F.2d 237, 244–45 (3d Cir. 1983) (Stern, J., dissenting); *LiButti v. United States*, 107 F.3d 110, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1997); *Brink's Inc. v. City of N.Y.*, 717 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting); *Harrell v. DCS Equip. Leasing Corp.*, 951 F.2d 1453, 1465 (5th Cir. 1992); *Veranda Beach Club v. W. Sur. Co.*, 936 F.2d 1364, 1374 (1st Cir. 1991); *In re: TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.*, Case No. 07-md-01827, Dkt. No. 5536, at 88:9–19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012); *In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.*, No. 04–1616–JWL, 2013 WL 100250, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 2013); *Cotton v. City of Eureka*, No. C–08–04386 SBA (EDL), 2010 WL 2889498, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); *Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc.*, 622 F. Supp. 2d 890, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2009); *Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC*, 813 F. Supp. 2d 489, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); The Court's Jury Instructions, *Coquina Invs. v. Rothstein & TD Bank, N.A.*, No. 10-60786-Civ-Cooke/Bandstra (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2012), Dkt. 745 at 19–20; Court's Instructions to the Jury, *Sanchez v. Brokop*, No. 04-cv-0134 LCS/RLP (D.N.M. July 22, 2005), Dkt. 158 at 15; 4/14/2017 A. Levandowski Dep. Tr. 85:8–12, 85:17–88:6; 8/22/2017 A. Levandowski Dep. 193:9–195:10.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 6 Re. CORPORATE LIABILITY⁸ Offered By Waymo**

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4 Under the law, corporations and limited liability companies are considered to be persons.
5 They can only act through its employees, agents, directors, or officers. Therefore, a corporation
6 or limited liability company is responsible for the acts of its employees, agents, directors, or
officers performed within the scope of authority.

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25 ⁸ MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
26 THE NINTH CIRCUIT §4.2; Case 3:10-cv-03561-WHA Document 1928 at ¶15 (Oracle v.
Google Final Instructions).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 6 Re. CORPORATE LIABILITY Offered By Defendants**

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3 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 7 Re. TWO OR MORE PARTIES—DIFFERENT LEGAL**
2 **RIGHTS⁹ Offered By Waymo**

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4 There are three defendants in this trial, Uber Technologies, Inc., Ottomotto LLC, and Otto
5 Trucking LLC. You should decide the case against each defendant separately. Unless otherwise
6 stated, the instructions apply to all parties.

7 Both Ottomotto and Otto Trucking were founded by Anthony Levandowski, who is a
8 former Waymo employee. Uber has acquired Ottomotto and Mr. Levandowski is currently the
9 managing member of Otto Trucking.

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⁹ MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
27 THE NINTH CIRCUIT §1.8.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 7 Re. TWO OR MORE PARTIES—DIFFERENT LEGAL**
2 **RIGHTS¹⁰ Offered By Defendants**

3
4 There are three defendants in this trial, Uber Technologies, Inc., Ottomotto LLC, and Otto
5 Trucking LLC. You should decide the case against each defendant separately. Unless otherwise
6 stated, the instructions apply to all parties.

7 Uber acquired Ottomotto. Uber did not acquire Otto Trucking.
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26 ¹⁰ MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
27 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT §1.8.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 8 Re. INTRODUCTION TO VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY¹¹**

2 **Offered By Waymo and Otto Trucking**

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4 One may authorize another to act on his or her behalf in transactions with third persons.
5 This relationship is called “agency.” The person giving the authority is called the “principal”; the
6 person to whom authority is given is called the “agent.”

7 A principal is responsible for harm caused by the wrongful conduct of its agents while
8 acting within the scope of their authority.

9 An agent is always responsible for the harm caused by his own wrongful conduct, whether
10 or not the principal is also liable.

20 ¹¹ CACI 3700.

21 [One may authorize another to act on his or her behalf in transactions with third persons.
22 This relationship is called “agency.” The person giving the authority is called the
23 “principal”; the person to whom authority is given is called the “agent.”]

24 [An employer/A principal] is responsible for harm caused by the wrongful conduct of
25 [his/her/its] [employees/agents] while acting within the scope of their
[employment/authority].

26 [An [employee/agent] is always responsible for harm caused by [his/her/ its] own wrongful
27 conduct, whether or not the [employer/principal] is also liable.]

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 8 Re. INTRODUCTION TO VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY**

2 **Offered By Uber/Ottomotto**

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5 Uber and Ottomotto contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
6 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 9 Re. PARTY HAVING POWER TO PRODUCE BETTER**

2 **EVIDENCE¹² Offered By Waymo**

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4 You may consider the ability of each party to provide evidence. If a party provided weaker
5 evidence when it could have provided stronger evidence, you may distrust the weaker evidence.
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27 ¹² CACI 203
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 9 Re. PARTY HAVING POWER TO PRODUCE BETTER**

2 **EVIDENCE Offered By Defendants**

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4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 10 Re. OUTLINE OF TRIAL¹³ Offered By Waymo**

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¹³ MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT §1.21.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 10 Re. OUTLINE OF TRIAL Offered By Defendants**

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Dispute Instruction No. 11 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS—**INTRODUCTION¹⁴ Offered By Waymo**

This is an action for trade secret misappropriation relating to Waymo's self-driving car technology.

Waymo is alleging claims for trade secret misappropriation against Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking under both California law and Federal law. Trial Exhibit █ is a list of what Waymo claims as its trade secrets.

In support of its claims, Waymo asserts that it is the owner of information relating to its self-driving technology, including custom LIDAR systems that are used to enable the operation of fully self-driving vehicles.

Waymo claims that this information includes nine separate trade secrets and that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking misappropriated those trade secrets. "Misappropriation" means the improper acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secrets.

Waymo seeks damages as a result of Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking's trade secret

¹⁴ CACI 4400.

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [he/she/it] [is/was] the [owner/licensee] of [insert general description of alleged trade secret[s]].

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [this/these] [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [is/are] [a] trade secret[s] and that [name of defendant] misappropriated [it/them]. "Misappropriation" means the improper [acquisition/use/ or] disclosure of the trade secret[s].

[Name of plaintiff] also claims that [name of defendant]'s misappropriation caused [[him/her/it] harm/ or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly enriched].

[Name of defendant] denies [insert denial of any of the above claims].

[[Name of defendant] also claims [insert affirmative defenses].]

1 misappropriation.

2 Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking deny Waymo's claims. Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto
3 Trucking deny that any of the Alleged Trade Secrets is a trade secret, and deny that they
4 misappropriated any of the Alleged Trade Secrets.

5 Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking also claim that they have independently developed
6 the technology at issue.

7 Otto Trucking claims that has not ratified any actions of Anthony Levandowski and that
8 it is not vicariously liable for his alleged actions.

9 Otto Trucking also claims that it has had no involvement in the development of Uber's
10 LiDAR systems, uses commercially available LiDAR systems instead, and therefore cannot be
11 jointly and severally liable.
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Dispute Instruction No. 11 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS—**INTRODUCTION¹⁵ Offered By Defendants**

Waymo claims that it is the owner of trade secrets relating to the use of LiDAR in self-driving cars. Trial Exhibit █ is a list of what Waymo claims as its trade secrets. We will refer to this as “the Alleged Trade Secrets.”

Waymo claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking misappropriated the Alleged Trade Secrets. “Misappropriation” means the improper use of the Alleged Trade Secrets.¹⁶

Waymo also claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking’s misappropriation caused them to be unjustly enriched.

Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking deny Waymo’s claims. Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking deny that any of the Alleged Trade Secrets is a trade secret, and deny that they misappropriated any of the Alleged Trade Secrets.

¹⁵ CACI 4400.

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [he/she/it] [is/was] the [owner/licensee] of [insert general description of alleged trade secret[s]].

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [this/these] [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [is/are] [a] trade secret[s] and that [name of defendant] misappropriated [it/them]. “Misappropriation” means the improper [acquisition/use/ [or] disclosure] of the trade secret[s].

[Name of plaintiff] also claims that [name of defendant]’s misappropriation caused [[him/her/it] harm/ [or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly enriched].

[Name of defendant] denies [insert denial of any of the above claims].

[[Name of defendant] also claims [insert affirmative defenses].]

¹⁶ CACI 4400, Directions for Use (“To avoid confusion, instruct the jury only on the particular theory of misappropriation applicable under the facts of the case.”).

1 Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking also claim that they have independently developed
2 the technology at issue.

3 Otto Trucking claims that it has not ratified any actions of Anthony Levandowski and
4 that it is not vicariously liable for his alleged actions.

5 Otto Trucking also claims that it has had no involvement in the development of Uber's
6 LiDAR systems, uses commercially available LiDAR systems instead, and therefore cannot be
7 jointly and severally liable.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 12 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS—**
2 **ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ELEMENTS – CALIFORNIA LAW¹⁷ Offered By Waymo**

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4 Waymo claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking misappropriated trade secrets in
5 violation of California Law.

6 To succeed on this claim, Waymo must prove all of the following:

- 7 1. That Waymo owns one or more of the nine items identified as trade secrets by Waymo.
8 2. That one or more of the listed items were trade secrets at the time of the misappropriation;
9 3. That Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking improperly acquired, used, or disclosed one
10 or more of the trade secrets.

11 I will address the damages available to Waymo in a separate instruction.

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16 ¹⁷ CACI 4401.

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18 *[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] has misappropriated a trade secret. To*
19 *succeed on this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:*

- 20 1. **That [name of plaintiff] [owned/was a licensee of] [the following]:[describe each item**
21 *claimed to be a trade secret that is subject to the misappropriation claim];*
- 22 2. **That [this/these] [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [was/were] [a] trade**
23 *secret[s] at the time of the misappropriation;*
- 24 3. **That [name of defendant] improperly [acquired/used/ [or] disclosed] the trade secret[s];**
- 25 4. **That [[name of plaintiff] was harmed/ [or] [name of defendant] was unjustly enriched]; and**
- 26 5. **That [name of defendant]'s [acquisition/use/ [or] disclosure] was a substantial factor in**
27 *causing [[name of plaintiff]'s harm/ [or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly enriched].*

1 **Dispute Instruction No. 12 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS—**

2 **ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ELEMENTS – CALIFORNIA LAW¹⁸ Offered By Defendants**

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4 To succeed on its claim that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking misappropriated the
5 Alleged Trade Secrets, Waymo must prove all of the following:

- 6 1. That Waymo owned each claimed trade secret;
7 2. That the claimed trade secrets were secret at the time Waymo claims they were
8 misappropriated;
9 3. That Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking improperly acquired or improperly used
10 the trade secrets;
11 4. That Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking were unjustly enriched; and
12 5. That Uber's, Ottomotto's, or Otto Trucking's use of the trade secrets was a
13 substantial factor in causing Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking to be unjustly enriched.¹⁹

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15¹⁸ CACI 4401.

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17 [Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] has misappropriated a trade secret. To
18 succeed on this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

- 19 1. That [name of plaintiff] [owned/was a licensee of] [the following]:[describe each item
20 claimed to be a trade secret that is subject to the misappropriation claim];
21 2. That [this/these] [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [was/were] [a] trade
22 secret[s] at the time of the misappropriation;
23 3. That [name of defendant] improperly [acquired/used/ [or] disclosed] the trade secret[s];
24 4. That [[name of plaintiff] was harmed/ [or] [name of defendant] was unjustly enriched]; and
25 5. That [name of defendant]'s [acquisition/use/ [or] disclosure] was a substantial factor in
26 causing [[name of plaintiff]'s harm/ [or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly enriched].

27 ¹⁹ CACI 4401, Directions for Use (“To avoid confusion, instruct the jury only on the particular
theory of misappropriation applicable under the facts of the case.”).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 13 Re. TRADE SECRET" DEFINED – CALIFORNIA LAW²⁰**

2 **Offered By Waymo**

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4 Under California law, to prove that Waymo's information were/are trade secrets, Waymo
5 must prove all of the following:

- 6 1. That the information was secret;
7 2. That the information had actual or potential independent economic value because it was
8 secret; and
9 3. That Waymo made reasonable efforts to keep the information secret.

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19 ²⁰ CACI 4402.
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22 **To prove that the [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [was/ were] [a] trade
23 secret[s], [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:**

- 24 1. That the [e.g., information] [was/were] secret;
25 2. That the [e.g., information] had actual or potential independent economic value because
26 [it was/they were] secret; and
27 3. That [name of plaintiff] made reasonable efforts to keep the [e.g., information] secret.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 13 Re. "TRADE SECRET" DEFINED – CALIFORNIA LAW²¹**

2 **Offered By Defendants**

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4 To prove that the Alleged Trade Secrets on its trade secret list is trade secret, Waymo must
5 prove all of the following:

- 6 1. That the Alleged Trade Secret is secret;
7 2. That the Alleged Trade Secret had actual or potential independent economic value
8 because it was secret; and
9 3. That Waymo made reasonable efforts to keep the Alleged Trade Secret secret.

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²¹ CACI 4402.
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22 To prove that the [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [was/ were] [a] trade
23 secret[s], [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:
24
25 1. That the [e.g., information] [was/were] secret;
26 2. That the [e.g., information] had actual or potential independent economic value because
27 [it was/they were] secret; and
28 3. That [name of plaintiff] made reasonable efforts to keep the [e.g., information] secret.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 14 Re. GENERALIZED KNOWLEDGE Offered By Waymo**

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3 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 14 Re. GENERALIZED KNOWLEDGE²² Offered By Defendants**

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4 Generalized knowledge and skill that an employee learned on the job is not a trade secret.
 5 Matters of general knowledge in a trade or special knowledge of persons who are skilled in a trade
 6 are also not trade secrets.

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17 ²² *Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co.*, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002) (rejecting doctrine of inevitable
 18 disclosure); *DVD Copy Control Ass'n., Inc. v. Bunner*, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241, 251 (2004) ("[I]n
 19 short, the test for a trade secret is whether the matter sought to be protected is information (1)
 20 that is valuable because it is unknown to others and (2) that the owner has attempted to keep
 21 secret. The first element is the crucial one here: in order to qualify as a trade secret, the
 22 information 'must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in
 23 the trade or business.'") (citations omitted); *Winston Research Corp. v. 3M*, 350 F.2d 134, 139
 24 (9th Cir. 1965) ("There was expert testimony that if a technician in the field were asked to design
 25 a machine having the time-displacement error achieved by the Mincom machine he would adopt
 26 the general approach of reducing the inertia of rotating parts and utilizing a wide band servo
 27 system — that this approach was dictated by well known principles of physics. It was therefore
 28 not protectible under accepted trade secret doctrine. It was not 'secret,' for it consisted
 essentially of general engineering principles in the public domain and part of the intellectual
 equipment of technical employees. Its disclosure could not be treated as betrayal of a confidence
 placed by Mincom in its technical employees."); *Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen*, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244,
 253 (1968) ("the complainant should describe the subject matter of the trade secret with
 sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special
 knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the trade, and to permit the defendant to ascertain
 at least the boundaries within which the secret lies.").

1 **Stipulated Instruction No. 15 Re. SECRECY REQUIREMENT – CALIFORNIA**

2 **LAW²³**

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4 Under California law, the secrecy required to prove that something is a trade secret does
5 not have to be absolute in the sense that no one else in the world possesses the information. It may
6 be disclosed to employees involved in Waymo's use of the trade secret as long as they are
7 instructed to keep the information secret. It may also be disclosed to nonemployees if they are
8 obligated to keep the information secret. However, it must not have been generally known to the
9 public or to people who could obtain value from knowing it.

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21 ²³ CACI 4403.

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23

24 **The secrecy required to prove that something is a trade secret does not have to be absolute**
25 **in the sense that no one else in the world possesses the information. It may be disclosed to**
26 **employees involved in [name of plaintiff]'s use of the trade secret as long as they are**
27 **instructed to keep the information secret. It may also be disclosed to nonemployees if they**
28 **are obligated to keep the information secret. However, it must not have been generally**
 known to the public or to people who could obtain value from knowing it.

1 **Stipulated Instruction No. 16 Re. "INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC VALUE"**

2 **EXPLAINED – CALIFORNIA LAW²⁴**

4 Under California law, each claimed trade secret has independent economic value if it gives
5 the owner an actual or potential business advantage over others who do not know the information
6 and who could obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

7 In determining whether information had actual or potential independent economic value
8 because it was secret, you may consider the following:

- 9 a) The extent to which Waymo obtained or could obtain economic value from the
10 information in keeping it secret;
- 11 b) The extent to which others could obtain economic value from the information

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²⁴ CACI 4412.

13 [Select short term to describe, e.g., *Information*] has independent economic value if it gives
14 the owner an actual or potential business advantage over others who do not know the [e.g.,
15 *information*] and who could obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

16 In determining whether [e.g., *information*] had actual or potential independent economic
17 value because it was secret, you may consider the following:

- 18 (a) The extent to which [name of plaintiff] obtained or could obtain economic value from
19 the [e.g., *information*] in keeping [it/them] secret;
- 20 (b) The extent to which others could obtain economic value from the [e.g., *information*] if [it
21 were/they were] not secret;
- 22 (c) The amount of time, money, or labor that [name of plaintiff] expended in developing the
23 [e.g., *information*];
- 24 (d) The amount of time, money, or labor that [would be/was] saved by a competitor who
25 used the [e.g., *information*];
- 26 [(e) [Insert other applicable factors].]

27 The presence or absence of any one or more of these factors is not necessarily
28 determinative.

1 if it were not secret;

2 c) The amount of time, money, or labor that Waymo expended in developing the
3 information;

4 d) The amount of time, money, or labor that Uber, Ottomotto and/or Otto Trucking
5 would be or was by using the information;

6 The presence or absence of any one or more of these factors is not necessarily
7 determinative.

1 **Stipulated Instruction No. 17 Re. REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROTECT SECRECY -**

2 **CALIFORNIA LAW²⁵**

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²⁵ CACI 4404.

6 **To establish that the [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [is/ are] [a] trade**
7 **secret[s], [name of plaintiff] must prove that [he/she/it] made reasonable efforts under the**
circumstances to keep it secret.

8 “Reasonable efforts” are the efforts that would be made by a reasonable [person/business]
9 in the same situation and having the same knowledge and resources as [name of plaintiff],
10 exercising due care to protect important information of the same kind. [This requirement
applies separately to each item that [name of plaintiff] claims to be a trade secret.]

11 **In determining whether or not [name of plaintiff] made reasonable efforts to keep the [e.g.,**
12 **information] secret, you should consider all of the facts and circumstances. Among the**
factors you may consider are the following:

13 **[a. Whether documents or computer files containing the [e.g., information] were marked**
14 **with confidentiality warnings;]**

15 **[b. Whether [name of plaintiff] instructed [his/her/its] employees to treat the [e.g.,**
16 **information] as confidential;]**

17 **[c. Whether [name of plaintiff] restricted access to the [e.g., information] to persons who had**
18 **a business reason to know the information;]**

19 **[d. Whether [name of plaintiff] kept the [e.g., information] in a restricted or secured area;]**

20 **[e. Whether [name of plaintiff] required employees or others with access to the [e.g.,**
21 **information] to sign confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements;]**

22 **[f. Whether [name of plaintiff] took any action to protect the specific [e.g., information], or**
23 **whether it relied on general measures taken to protect its business information or assets;]**

24 **[g. The extent to which any general measures taken by [name of plaintiff] would prevent the**
25 **unauthorized disclosure of the [e.g., information];]**

26 **[h. Whether there were other reasonable measures available to [name of plaintiff] that**
27 **[he/she/it] did not take;]**

28 **[i. Specify other factor(s).]**

Under California law, to establish that Waymo's information are trade secrets, Waymo must prove that it made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to keep the information secret. "Reasonable efforts" are the efforts that would be made by a reasonable business in the same situation and having the same knowledge and resources as Waymo, exercising due care to protect important information of the same kind. This requirement applies separately to each item that Waymo claims to be a trade secret.

In determining whether or not Waymo made reasonable efforts to keep the information secret, you should consider all of the facts and circumstances. Among the factors you may consider are the following:

- a. Whether products, hardware, documents or computer files containing the information were marked with confidentiality warnings;
- b. Whether Waymo instructed its employees to treat the information as confidential;
- c. Whether Waymo restricted access to the information to persons who had a business reason to know the information;
- d. Whether Waymo kept the information in a restricted or secured area;
- e. Whether Waymo required employees or others with access to the information to sign confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements;
- f. Whether Waymo took any action to protect the specific information, or whether it relied on general measures taken to protect its business information or assets;
- g. The extent to which any general measures taken by Waymo would prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the information;
- h. Whether there were other reasonable measures available to Waymo that it did not take;

The presence or absence of any one or more of these factors is not necessarily determinative.

1 The presence or absence of any one or more of these factors is not necessarily
2 determinative.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 18 Re. DECLARING TRADE SECRETS Offered By Waymo**

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3 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 18 Re. DECLARING TRADE SECRETS²⁶ Offered By**

2 **Defendants**

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4 Merely declaring that something is confidential or a trade secret is not evidence that the
5 information is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
6 secrecy.

1 **Disputed Instruction 19. Re. MISAPPROPRIATION BY ACQUISITION – CALIFORNIA**

2 **LAW²⁷ Offered By Waymo**

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4 Under California law, Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking misappropriated Waymo's
5 trade secrets by acquisition if Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acquired the trade secrets
6 and knew or had reason to know that any person used improper means to acquire them.
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24 ²⁷ CACI 4405.

25 [Name of defendant] misappropriated [name of plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] by acquisition if
26 [name of defendant] acquired the trade secret[s] and knew or had reason to know that
[he/she/it/[name of third party]] used improper means to acquire [it/them].
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1 **Disputed Instruction 19. Re. MISAPPROPRIATION BY ACQUISITION – CALIFORNIA**

2 **LAW²⁸ Offered By Defendants**

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4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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24 ²⁸ CACI 4405.

25 [Name of defendant] misappropriated [name of plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] by acquisition if
26 [name of defendant] acquired the trade secret[s] and knew or had reason to know that
[he/she/it/[name of third party]] used improper means to acquire [it/them].

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 20 Re. PASSIVE OR INADVERTENT RECEIPT Offered By**

2 **Waymo**

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4 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 20 Re. PASSIVE OR INADVERTENT RECEIPT²⁹ Offered By**

2 **Defendants**

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4 Passively or inadvertently receiving Waymo's trade secrets is not evidence that Uber,
 5 Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking misappropriated Waymo's trade secrets. Instead, you may only find
 6 that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking misappropriated Waymo's trade secrets if Waymo proves
 7 by a preponderance of the evidence that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking undertook pointed
 8 conduct intended to secure dominion over Waymo's trade secrets.

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21 ²⁹ *Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp.*, 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 222 (2010), as modified on denial of
 22 reh'g (May 27, 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by *Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court*,
 23 51 Cal. 4th 310 (2011) (“To acquire a thing is, most broadly, to ‘receive’ or ‘come into
 24 possession of’ it. (1 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989), p. 115.) But the term implies more than
 25 passive reception; it implies pointed conduct intended to secure dominion over the thing, i.e.,
 26 ‘[t]o gain, obtain, or get as one’s own, to gain the ownership of (by one’s own exertions or
 27 qualities).’ (See id. at p. 115 [‘acquisition’ as ‘[t]he action of obtaining or getting for oneself, or
 by one’s own exertion’].) One does not ordinarily ‘acquire’ a thing inadvertently; the term
 implies conduct directed to that objective. The choice of that term over ‘receive’ suggests that
 inadvertently coming into possession of a trade secret will not constitute acquisition. Thus one
 who passively receives a trade secret, but neither discloses nor uses it, would not be guilty of
 misappropriation.”); see also CACI 4405 (citing to *Silvaco*).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 21. Re. MISAPPROPRIATION BY USE – CALIFORNIA LAW³⁰**

2 **Offered By Waymo**

3
4 Under California law, Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking misappropriated Waymo's
5 trade secrets by use if Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking used them without Waymo's consent
6 and did any of the following:

- 7 1. Acquired knowledge of the trade secrets by improper means; or
8 2. At the time of use, knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of Waymo's trade secrets

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11 ³⁰ CACI 4407.

12 [Name of defendant] misappropriated [name of plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] by use if [name of
13 defendant]

- 14 1. used [it/them] without [name of plaintiff]'s consent; and
15 2. [did any of the following:]
16 2. [insert one or more of the following:]
17 2. [acquired knowledge of the trade secret[s] by improper means][./ ; or]
18 2. [at the time of use, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of [name of
19 plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] came from or through [name of third party], and that [name of
20 third party] had previously acquired the trade secret[s] by improper means][./; or]
21 2. [at the time of use, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of [name of
22 plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] was acquired under circumstances creating a legal obligation to
23 limit use of the [select short term to describe, e.g., information]][./; or]
24 2. [at the time of use, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of [name of
25 plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] came from or through [name of third party], and that [name of
26 third party] had a duty to [name of plaintiff] to limit use of the [e.g., information]][./; or]
27 2. [Before a material change of [his/her/its] position, knew or had reason to know that [it
28 was/they were] [a] trade secret[s] and that knowledge of [it/them] had been acquired by
accident or mistake.]

- 1 came from or through a third party or other defendant, and that the third party or other
2 defendant had previously acquired the trade secrets by improper means; or
- 3 3. At the time of use, knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of Waymo's trade secrets
4 was acquired under circumstances creating a legal obligation to limit use of the
5 information; or
- 6 4. At the time of use, knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of Waymo's trade secrets
7 came from or through a third party, and that third party had a duty to Waymo to limit use
8 of the information.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 21. Re. MISAPPROPRIATION BY USE – CALIFORNIA LAW³¹**

2 **Offered By Defendants**

3

4 Uber and/or Ottomotto misappropriated Waymo's claimed trade secrets by use if they
5 used them without Waymo's consent and did any of the following:

6

- 7 1. Acquired knowledge of the trade secrets by improper means; or
8 2. At the time of use, knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of Waymo's trade secrets
9 came from or through Anthony Levandowski, and that Anthony Levandowski had previously

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³¹ CACI 4407.

11 [*Name of defendant*] misappropriated [*name of plaintiff*]'s trade secret[s] by use if [*name of*
12 *defendant*]

- 13 1. used [it/them] without [*name of plaintiff*]'s consent; and
14 2. [did any of the following:]

15 [insert one or more of the following:]

16 [acquired knowledge of the trade secret[s] by improper means][./ ; or]

17 [at the time of use, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of
18 [i name of plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] came from or through [*name of third party*], and that
19 [i name of third party] had previously acquired the trade secret[s] by improper means][./; or]

20 [at the time of use, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of
21 [i name of plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] was acquired under circumstances creating a legal
22 obligation to limit use of the [*select short term to describe, e.g., information*]][./; or]

23 [at the time of use, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of
24 [i name of plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] came from or through [*name of third party*], and that
25 [i name of third party] had a duty to [*name of plaintiff*] to limit use of the [*e.g.,*
26 *information*]][./; or]

27 [Before a material change of [his/her/its] position, knew or had reason to know that
28 [it was/they were] [a] trade secret[s] and that knowledge of [it/them] had been acquired by
accident or mistake.]

1 acquired the trade secrets by improper means.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 22. Re. DIFFERING PRODUCTS³² Offered By Waymo**

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4 Misappropriation by use of trade secrets occurs even if the defendants' product differs in
 some respects from the trade secret.

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17 ³² *Speech Tech. Assocs. v. Adaptive Commc'n Sys., Inc.*, 1994 WL 449032, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
 Aug. 16, 1994) (holding defendants liable on trade secrets misappropriation, "some of the
 technology used in the new products was different, many of the technical aspects, and most of
 the functional aspects of Prototype # 1 were incorporated into the revised Alltalks. The
 incidental differences between Prototype # 1 and the redesigned Alltalks do not absolve
 defendants from liability for misappropriation of trade secrets."); *see also InfoSpan, Inc. v.
 Emirates NBD Bank PJSC*, 2015 WL 13357646, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2015) ("[T]he Bank
 cannot avoid liability for misappropriation by allegedly taking a bundle of trade secrets and not
 using the entire bundle, but then selectively choosing which ones it would use. . . . InfoSpan
 does not argue that the Bank used its SpanCash trade secrets to create a product with all the
 claimed unique features of SpanCash. Instead, InfoSpan contends that it has presented sufficient
 evidence to show a genuine dispute as to whether the Bank used InfoSpan's trade secrets to
 research, develop, and/or modify four specific Bank products: . . . The Court agrees . . .");
Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, 2008 WL 564634, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2008) (granting
 preliminary injunction on trade secrets misappropriation claim, "[u]nder California law, minor
 variations in a product do not negate a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.").

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 22. Re. DIFFERING PRODUCTS Offered By Defendants**

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3 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 23. Re. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE Offered By Waymo**

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3 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 23. Re. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE³³ Offered By Defendants**

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3 To find misappropriation by use you must find that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking
4 actually used the claimed trade secret. It is not enough for Waymo to show that their employees
5 would inevitably use the claimed trade secret in their work for Uber. Waymo must show that Uber,
6 Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking directly exploited Waymo's claimed trade secret for their own
7 advantage.

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³³ *Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co.*, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1458, 1463–64 (2002) (“Lest there be any
27 doubt about our holding, our rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is complete.”); Cal.
28 Bus. & Prof. Code Section 16600.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 24 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION BY DISCLOSURE –**

2 **CALIFORNIA LAW³⁴ Offered By Waymo**

3
4 Under California law, Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking misappropriated Waymo's
5 trade secrets by disclosure if Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking disclosed any trade secret
6 without Waymo's consent and did any of the following:

- 7 1. Acquired knowledge of the trade secrets by improper means; or
8 2. At the time of disclosure, knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of

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11 ³⁴ CACI 4406.

12 [*Name of defendant*] misappropriated [*name of plaintiff*]'s trade secret[s] by disclosure if
13 [*name of defendant*] 1. disclosed [it/them] without [*name of plaintiff*]'s consent; and

14 2. [did any of the following:]

15 2. [*insert one or more of the following:*]

16 2. [acquired knowledge of the trade secret[s] by improper means][./; or]

17 2. [at the time of disclosure, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of
18 [*name of plaintiff*]'s trade secret[s] came from or through [*name of third party*], and that
19 [*name of third party*] had previously acquired the trade secret[s] by improper means][./; or]

20 2. [at the time of disclosure, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of
21 [*name of plaintiff*]'s trade secret[s] was acquired [*insert circumstances giving rise to duty to*
22 *maintain secrecy*], which created a duty to keep the [*select short term to describe, e.g.,*
23 *information*] secret][./; or]

24 2. [at the time of disclosure, knew or had reason to know that [his/her/its] knowledge of
25 [*name of plaintiff*]'s trade secret[s] came from or through [*name of third party*], and that
26 [*name of third party*] had a duty to [*name of plaintiff*] to keep the [*e.g., information*]
27 secret][./; or]

28 2. [Before a material change of [his/her/its] position, knew or had reason to know that [it
29 was/they were] [a] trade secret[s] and that knowledge of [it/them] had been acquired by
30 accident or mistake.]

1 Waymo's trade secrets came from or through a third party or other defendant, and
2 that the third party or other defendant had previously acquired the trade secrets by
3 improper means; or

- 4 3. At the time of disclosure, knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of
5 Waymo's trade secrets was acquired by virtue of a third parties' employment with
6 Waymo, which created a duty to keep the information secret; or
7 4. At the time of disclosure, knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of
8 Waymo's trade secrets came from or through a third party and that third party had
9 a duty to Waymo to keep the information secret.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 24 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION BY DISCLOSURE -**

2 **CALIFORNIA LAW Offered By Defendants**

3
4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Stipulated Instruction No. 25 Re. IMPROPER MEANS OF ACQUIRING TRADE**

2 **SECRET – CALIFORNIA LAW³⁵**

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4 Under California law, improper means of acquiring a trade secret or knowledge of a trade
5 secret include, but are not limited to, theft, misrepresentation, breach or inducing a breach of a
6 duty to maintain secrecy.

7 However, it is not improper to acquire a trade secret or knowledge of the trade secret by
8 any of the following:

- 9 1. Independent efforts to invent or discover the information;
- 10 2. Reverse engineering; that is, examining or testing a product to determine how it
11 works, by a person who has a right to possess the product;
- 12 3. Observing the information in public use or on public display; or

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15 ³⁵ CACI 4408.

16 **Improper means of acquiring a trade secret or knowledge of a trade secret include, but are
17 not limited to, [theft/bribery/misrepresentation/ breach or inducing a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy/ [or] wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, [or] [insert other means of
espionage]].**

18 **[However, it is not improper to acquire a trade secret or knowledge of the trade secret by
19 any of the following]:**

20 **[1. Independent efforts to invent or discover the information;]**

21 **[2. Reverse engineering; that is, examining or testing a product to determine how it works,
22 by a person who has a right to possess the product;]**

23 **[3. Obtaining the information as a result of a license agreement with the owner of the
24 information;]**

25 **[4. Observing the information in public use or on public display;] [or]**

26 **[5. Obtaining the information from published literature, such as trade journals, reference
27 books, the Internet, or other publicly available sources.]]**

1 4 . Obtaining the information from published literature, such as trade journals,
2 reference books, the Internet, or other publicly available sources.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 26. Re. CHANGING EMPLOYERS Offered By Waymo**

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3 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 26. Re. CHANGING EMPLOYERS³⁶ Offered By Defendants**

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3 You have heard testimony that employees of Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking used to
4 work for Google and/or Waymo. The mere fact that employees left Google or Waymo to work for
5 one of these companies does not mean that they used Waymo's trade secrets after they left Google
6 or Waymo. Employees are allowed to change employers, and to apply their talents and skill sets
7 in their new jobs. However, they may not use trade secrets that belong to their former employer.

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26 ³⁶ *Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co.*, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1458, 1463–64 (2002) (“Lest there be
27 any doubt about our holding, our rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is complete.”);
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 16600.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 27 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS—**

2 **INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL LAW³⁷ Offered By Waymo**

4 Waymo has also brought a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under Federal law.

5 An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may also bring a civil action under
6 Federal Law if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in,
7 interstate or foreign commerce.

8 To succeed on this claim, Waymo must prove all of the following:

- 9 1. That Waymo owns one or more of the nine items identified as trade secrets by Waymo;
- 10 2. That one or more of the listed items were trade secrets are related to a product or service
11 used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce; and
- 12 3. That Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking improperly acquired, used, or disclosed one
13 or more of the trade secrets;

14 I will address the damages available to Waymo in a separate instruction.

23
24 ³⁷ 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1).

25 **(1) In general.--An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action**
26 **under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or**
27 **intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.**

Disputed Instruction No. 27 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS—**INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL LAW Offered By Defendants**

Waymo has also brought a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under a federal statute called the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. If you find that Waymo has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking misappropriated any of Waymo's nine trade secrets under state law, you should then consider whether Waymo has established by a preponderance of the evidence that "the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce."³⁸

If you find that Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking misappropriated any of Waymo's claimed trade secrets based solely upon acts of misappropriation taking place before May 11, 2016, you may not find that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking misappropriated that trade secret under federal law.³⁹

"Interstate commerce" is commercial activity that crosses more than one country or state, such as the movement of goods from one state to another.⁴⁰

³⁸ 18 U.S.C. 1836(b)(1) ("An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.").

³⁹ *Avago Techs. U.S. Inc. v. Nanoprecision Prods., Inc.*, No. 16-cv-03737-JCS, 2017 WL 412524, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) ("The DTSA applies to 'any misappropriation of a trade secret ... for which any act occurs on or after the date of the enactment of [the] Act.' (quoting Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, PL 114-153, May 11, 2016, 130 Stat. 376. The date of enactment was May 11, 2016.)).

⁴⁰ CACI 2900, FELA – Essential Factual Elements ([“‘Interstate commerce’ is commercial activity that crosses more than one country or state, such as the movement of goods from one state to another.”]).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 28 Re. TRADE SECRET DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW⁴¹ Offered**

2 **By Waymo**

3
4 Under Federal law, the term “trade secret” includes all forms and types of scientific,
5 technical, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
6 formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
7 whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
8 electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if the owner thereof has taken
9 reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and the information derives independent
10 economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
11 ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the
12 disclosure or use of the information.

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17 ⁴¹ 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839.
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20 **(3) the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
21 technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations,
22 program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes,
23 procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how
24 stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically,
25 or in writing if--**

26 **(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and**

27 **(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
28 being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by,
another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information;**

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 28 Re. TRADE SECRET DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW Offered**

2 **By Defendants**

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4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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Disputed Instruction No. 29 Re. OWNERSHIP DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW⁴² Offered By

Waymo

Under Federal law, the term “owner”, with respect to a trade secret, means the person or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is reposed.

42 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839.

(4) the term “owner”, with respect to a trade secret, means the person or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is reposed;

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 29 Re. OWNERSHIP DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW Offered By**

2 **Defendants**

3
4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 30 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW⁴³**

2 **Offered By Waymo**

3

4 Under Federal law, the term “misappropriation” means acquisition of a trade secret of
5 another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by
6 improper means.

7 Misappropriation also includes disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without

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9 ⁴³ 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839.

10

11 **(5) the term “misappropriation” means--**

12 **(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know
13 that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or**

14 **(B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a
15 person who--**

16 **(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret;**

17 **(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that the knowledge of the
18 trade secret was--**

19 **(I) derived from or through a person who had used improper means to acquire the trade
20 secret;**

21 **(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade
22 secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or**

23 **(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
24 maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or**

25 **(iii) before a material change of the position of the person, knew or had reason to know
26 that--**

27 **(I) the trade secret was a trade secret; and**

28 **(II) knowledge of the trade secret had been acquired by accident or mistake;**

1 express or implied consent by a person who used improper means to acquire knowledge of the
2 trade secret or at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that the knowledge of
3 the trade secret was derived from or through a person who had used improper means to acquire
4 the trade secret; acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of the
5 trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or derived from or through a person who owed a
6 duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the
7 trade secret.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 30 Re. MISAPPROPRIATION DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW**

2 **Offered By Defendants**

3
4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 31 Re. IMPROPER MEANS DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW⁴⁴**

2 **Offered By Waymo**

3
4 Under Federal law, the term “improper means” includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation,
5 breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic
6 or other means. Improper means does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or
7 any other lawful means of acquisition.

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⁴⁴ 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839.
21
22 **(6) the term “improper means”--**

- 23 **(A) includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty**
24 **to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means; and**
- 25 **(B) does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful**
26 **means of acquisition; and**
- 27
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 31 Re. IMPROPER MEANS DEFINED – FEDERAL LAW**

2 **Offered By Defendants**

3
4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 32 Re. DUTY TO EMPLOYER⁴⁵ Offered By Waymo**

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Under both Federal and California law, an employee has a duty not to use or disclose trade secrets that the employee acquired during the course of his or her employment. This duty survives the termination of the employment relationship.

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26 ⁴⁵ *Blackbird Technologies, Inc. v. Joshi*, No. 5:15-CV-04272-EJD, 2015 WL 5818067, at *4
27 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2015), *appeal dismissed* (Nov. 23, 2015)

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 32 Re. DUTY TO EMPLOYER Offered By Waymo**

2
3 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 33 Re. COMBINATIONS AS TRADE SECRETS⁴⁶ Offered By**

2 **Waymo**

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4 Under both Federal and California law, combinations of public information from a variety
5 of different sources when combined in a novel way can be a trade secret. It does not matter if a
6 portion of the trade secret is generally known, or even that every individual portion of the trade
7 secret is generally known, as long as the combination of all such information is not generally
8 known.

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24 ⁴⁶ *02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc.*, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
25 *Leatt Corp. v. Innovative Safety Tech., LLC*, 2010 WL 1526382 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010);
26 *SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc.*, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Cal. 2012); *United States v. Nosal*,
27 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016); *Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder*, 2008 WL 564634 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29,
28 2008).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 33 Re. COMBINATIONS AS TRADE SECRETS Offered By**

2 **Defendants**

3
4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 34 Re. WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS MISAPPROPRIATION**

2 **OF TRADE SECRETS⁴⁷ Offered By Waymo**

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4

5 If you decide that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking have misappropriated a trade
 6 secret of Waymo under either California or Federal law, you will be asked on your verdict form to
 7 indicate whether such misappropriation was willful and malicious. Waymo must prove that Uber,
 8 Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted willfully and maliciously by clear and convincing evidence.

9 “Willfully” means that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted with a purpose or
 10 willingness to commit the act or engage in the conduct in question, and the conduct was not
 reasonable under the circumstances at the time and was not undertaken in good faith.

11 “Maliciously” means that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted with an intent to

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13 ⁴⁷ 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836; CACI 4411.

14 **If you decide that [name of defendant]’s misappropriation caused [name of plaintiff] harm,
 15 you must decide whether that conduct justifies an award of punitive damages. The
 16 purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed
 [name of plaintiff] and to discourage similar conduct in the future.**

17 **In order to recover punitive damages, [name of plaintiff] must prove [by clear and
 18 convincing evidence] that [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously. You must
 19 determine whether [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously, but you will not be
 asked to determine the amount of any punitive damages. I will calculate the amount later.**

20 **“Willfully” means that [name of defendant] acted with a purpose or willingness to commit
 21 the act or engage in the conduct in question, and the conduct was not reasonable under the
 circumstances at the time and was not undertaken in good faith.**

22 **“Maliciously” means that [name of defendant] acted with an intent to cause injury, or that
 23 [name of defendant]’s conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing
 disregard for the rights of others.**

24 **“Despicable conduct” is conduct so vile, base, or wretched that it would be looked down on
 25 and despised by ordinary decent people. [Name of defendant] acted with knowing disregard
 26 if [he/she/it] was aware of the probable consequences of [his/her/its] conduct and
 deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.**

1 cause injury, or that Uber and/or Otto Trucking's conduct was despicable and was done with a
2 willful and knowing disregard for the rights of others.

3 "Despicable conduct" is conduct so vile, base, or wretched that it would be looked down
4 on and despised by ordinary decent people. Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted with
5 knowing disregard if it was aware of the probable consequences of its conduct and deliberately
6 failed to avoid those consequences.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 34 Re. WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS MISAPPROPRIATION**

2 **OF TRADE SECRETS⁴⁸ Offered By Defendants**

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5 If you decide that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking misappropriated the alleged trade
 6 secrets and caused Waymo harm, you must decide whether that conduct justifies an award of
 7 punitive damages. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct
 8 that harmed Waymo and to discourage similar conduct in the future.

9 In order to recover punitive damages, Waymo must prove by clear and convincing evidence
 10 that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking acted willfully and maliciously. You must determine
 11 whether Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking acted willfully and maliciously, but you will not be
 12 asked to determine the amount of any punitive damages. I will calculate the amount later.

13 ⁴⁸ CACI 4411.

14 **If you decide that [name of defendant]’s misappropriation caused [name of plaintiff] harm,
 15 you must decide whether that conduct justifies an award of punitive damages. The
 16 purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed
 17 [name of plaintiff] and to discourage similar conduct in the future.**

18 **In order to recover punitive damages, [name of plaintiff] must prove [by clear and
 19 convincing evidence] that [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously. You must
 20 determine whether [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously, but you will not be
 21 asked to determine the amount of any punitive damages. I will calculate the amount later.**

22 **“Willfully” means that [name of defendant] acted with a purpose or willingness to commit
 23 the act or engage in the conduct in question, and the conduct was not reasonable under the
 24 circumstances at the time and was not undertaken in good faith.**

25 **“Maliciously” means that [name of defendant] acted with an intent to cause injury, or that
 26 [name of defendant]’s conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing
 27 disregard for the rights of others.**

28 **“Despicable conduct” is conduct so vile, base, or wretched that it would be looked down on
 29 and despised by ordinary decent people. [Name of defendant] acted with knowing disregard
 30 if [he/she/it] was aware of the probable consequences of [his/her/its] conduct and
 31 deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.**

1 “Willfully” means that the party acted with a purpose or willingness to commit the act or
2 engage in the conduct in question, and the conduct was not reasonable under the circumstances at
3 the time and was not undertaken in good faith.

4 “Maliciously” means that the party acted with an intent to cause injury, or that Uber’s,
5 Ottomotto’s, or Otto Trucking’s conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing
6 disregard for the rights of others. “Despicable conduct” is conduct so vile, base, or wretched that
7 it would be looked down on and despised by ordinary decent people. Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto
8 Trucking acted with knowing disregard if it was aware of the probable consequences of its conduct
9 and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 35 Re. TORT LIABILITY ASSERTED AGAINST**
 2 **PRINCIPAL—ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ELEMENTS⁴⁹ Offered By Waymo**

3
 4 Waymo claims that it was harmed by the misappropriation of one or more of defendants'
 5 agents.

6 Waymo also claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking is responsible for the harm
 7 caused by the trade secret misappropriation because a third party was acting as its agent in
 8 connection with the trade secret misappropriation.

9 If you find that the trade secret misappropriation harmed Waymo, then you must decide
 10 whether Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking is responsible for the harm.

11 Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking is responsible if Waymo proves both of the
 12 following:

- 13 1. That a third party was Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking's agent; and
 14 2. That the third party was acting within the scope of their agency within the scope of its
 15 agency when it harmed Waymo.

16 49 CACI 3701.
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18 [Name of plaintiff] claims that [he/she] was harmed by [name of agent]'s [insert tort theory,
 19 e.g., "negligence"].

20 [Name of plaintiff] also claims that [name of defendant] is responsible for the harm because
 21 [name of agent] was acting as [his/her/its] [agent/employee/[insert other relationship, e.g.,
 22 "partner"]]] when the incident occurred.

23 If you find that [name of agent]'s [insert tort theory] harmed [name of plaintiff], then you
 24 must decide whether [name of defendant] is responsible for the harm. [Name of defendant]
 25 is responsible if [name of plaintiff] proves both of the following:

- 26 1. That [name of agent] was [name of defendant]'s [agent/employee/ [insert other
 27 relationship]]; and
 28 2. That [name of agent] was acting within the scope of [his/her] [agency/employment/[insert
 29 other relationship]] when [he/she] harmed [name of plaintiff].

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 35 Re. TORT LIABILITY ASSERTED AGAINST**
2 **PRINCIPAL—ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ELEMENTS⁵⁰ Offered By Otto Trucking**

3
4 Waymo claims that it was harmed by Mr. Levandowski's misappropriation of trade secrets.

5 Waymo also claims that Otto Trucking is responsible that harm because Mr. Levandowski
6 was acting as its agent when the misappropriation of trade secrets occurred.

7 If you find that the trade secret misappropriation harmed Waymo, then you must decide
8 whether Otto Trucking is responsible for the harm if Waymo proves both the following.

- 9 1. That Mr. Levandowski was Otto Trucking's agent; and
10 2. That Mr. Levandowski was acting within the scope of his agency when he harmed
11 Waymo.

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⁵⁰ CACI 3701.

18 [*Name of plaintiff*] claims that [he/she] was harmed by [*name of agent*]'s [*insert tort theory*,
e.g., "negligence"].

19 [*Name of plaintiff*] also claims that [*name of defendant*] is responsible for the harm because
20 [*name of agent*] was acting as [his/her/its] [agent/employee/[*insert other relationship*, e.g.,
21 "partner"]]] when the incident occurred.

22 If you find that [*name of agent*]'s [*insert tort theory*] harmed [*name of plaintiff*], then you
23 must decide whether [*name of defendant*] is responsible for the harm. [*Name of defendant*]
24 is responsible if [*name of plaintiff*] proves both of the following:

- 25 1. That [*name of agent*] was [*name of defendant*]'s [agent/employee/ [*insert other
relationship*]]; and
26 2. That [*name of agent*] was acting within the scope of [his/her] [agency/employment/[*insert
other relationship*]] when [he/she] harmed [*name of plaintiff*].

Disputed Instruction No. 35 Re. TORT LIABILITY ASSERTED AGAINST

PRINCIPAL—ESSENTIAL FACTUAL ELEMENTS Offered By Uber/Ottomotto

Uber and Ottomotto contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding memorandum of law).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 36 Re. EXISTENCE OF “AGENCY” RELATIONSHIP**
2 **DISPUTED⁵¹ Offered By Waymo**

3
4 Waymo claims that one or more third parties were Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto
5 Trucking's agent and that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking is therefore responsible for the
6 agent's conduct.

7 If Waymo proves that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking gave one or more third
8 parties authority to act on its behalf, then that third party was Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto
9 Trucking's agent. This authority may be shown by words or may be implied by the parties'
10 conduct. This authority cannot be shown by the words of the third party alone.

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24 ⁵¹ CACI 3705
25 [Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of agent] was [name of defendant]'s agent and that
26 [name of defendant] is therefore responsible for [name of agent]'s conduct.
27 If [name of plaintiff] proves that [name of defendant] gave [name of agent] authority to act
28 on [his/her/its] behalf, then [name of agent] was [name of defendant]'s agent. This
 authority may be shown by words or may be implied by the parties' conduct. This
 authority cannot be shown by the words of [name of agent] alone.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 36 Re. EXISTENCE OF “AGENCY” RELATIONSHIP**

2 **DISPUTED⁵² Offered By Otto Trucking**

3
4 Waymo claims that Mr. Levandowski was Otto Trucking’s agent and that Mr.
5 Levandowski is therefore responsible for Mr. Levandowski’s conduct.

6 If Waymo proves that Otto Trucking gave Mr. Levandowski authority to act on its behalf,
7 then Mr. Levandowski was Otto Trucking’s agent. This authority may be shown by words or may
8 be implied by the parties’ conduct. This authority cannot be shown by the words of Mr.
9 Levandowski alone.

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⁵² CACI 3705

25 [Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of agent] was [name of defendant]’s agent and that
26 [name of defendant] is therefore responsible for [name of agent]’s conduct.
27 If [name of plaintiff] proves that [name of defendant] gave [name of agent] authority to act
28 on [his/her/its] behalf, then [name of agent] was [name of defendant]’s agent. This
 authority may be shown by words or may be implied by the parties’ conduct. This
 authority cannot be shown by the words of [name of agent] alone.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 36 Re. EXISTENCE OF “AGENCY” RELATIONSHIP**

2 **DISPUTED Offered By Uber/Ottomotto**

3 Uber and Ottomotto contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 37 Re. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT Offered By Waymo and**

2 **Uber**

3
4 Waymo and Uber contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 37 Re. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT⁵³ Offered By Otto Trucking**

2
3 Waymo must prove that Mr. Levandowski was acting within the scope of his
4 authorization when Waymo was harmed.

5 Conduct is within the scope of authorization if:

- 6 (a) It was reasonably related to the kinds of tasks that the agent was employed to
7 perform; or
8 (b) It is reasonably foreseeable in light of the principal's business or the agent's
9 responsibilities.

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23 ⁵³ CACI 3720

24 **[Name of plaintiff] must prove that [name of agent] was acting within the scope of [his/her]**
25 **[employment/authorization] when [name of plaintiff] was harmed.**

26 **Conduct is within the scope of [employment/authorization] if:**

27 **(a) It is reasonably related to the kinds of tasks that the [employee/ agent] was employed to**
28 **perform; or**
29 **(b) It is reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer's business or the**
30 **[agent's/employee's job] responsibilities.**

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 38 Re. DUTY TO INFORM⁵⁴ Offered By Waymo**

2
3 If you find that a third party was an agent for Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking, each
4 agent is under a duty to inform that defendant as to all those matters which each would want to
5 know about any trade secrets misappropriated from Waymo. Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto
6 Trucking are presumed to know all that its agent or agents knew concerning the misappropriation,
7 whether that agent actually told Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking or not.”

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⁵⁴ *Droege v. Welsh Sporting Goods Corp.*, 541 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1976).

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 38 Re. DUTY TO INFORM Offered By Defendants**

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3 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction 39 Re. RATIFICATION⁵⁵ Offered By Waymo**

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3 Waymo also claims that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking is responsible for the harm
 4 caused by a third party's conduct because Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking approved of that
 5 conduct after it occurred. If you find that a third party harmed Waymo, you must decide whether
 6 Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking approved that conduct.

7 To establish its claim, Waymo must prove all of the following:

- 8 1. That a third party, although not authorized to do so, purported to act on behalf of Uber,
 9 Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking;
- 10 2. That Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking learned of that third party's unauthorized
 11 conduct, and all of the material facts involved in the misappropriation, after it occurred;
 12 and
- 13 3. That Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking then approved that third party's conduct.

14 Approval can be shown through words, or it can be inferred from a person's conduct.

15

16 ⁵⁵ CACI 3710.

17 [Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] is responsible for the harm caused by
 18 [name of agent]'s conduct because [name of defendant] approved that conduct after it
 19 occurred. If you find that [name of agent] harmed [name of plaintiff], you must decide
 20 whether [name of defendant] approved that conduct. To establish [his/her] claim, [name of
 21 plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

- 22 1. That [name of agent], although not authorized to do so, purported to act on behalf of
 23 [name of defendant];
- 24 2. That [name of defendant] learned of [name of agent]'s unauthorized conduct, and all of
 25 the material facts involved in the unauthorized transaction, after it occurred; and
- 26 3. That [name of defendant] then approved [name of agent]'s conduct.

27 Approval can be shown through words, or it can be inferred from a person's conduct.
 28 [Approval can be inferred if [name of defendant] voluntarily keeps the benefits of [name of
 29 agent]'s unauthorized conduct after [he/she/it] learns of it.]

1 Approval can be inferred if Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking voluntarily kept the benefit of
2 the third party's misappropriation after they learned of it.

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1 **Disputed Instruction 39 Re. RATIFICATION⁵⁶ Offered By Otto Trucking**

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4 Waymo also claims that Otto Trucking is responsible for the harm caused by Mr.
 5 Levandowski's conduct because Otto Trucking approved of that conduct after it occurred. If you
 6 find that a third party harmed Waymo, you must decide whether Otto Trucking approved that
 7 conduct.

8 To establish its claim, Waymo must prove all of the following:

- 9 1. That Mr. Levandowski, although not authorized to do so, purported to act on behalf of Otto
 10 Trucking;
- 11 2. That Otto Trucking learned Mr. Levandowski's unauthorized conduct after it occurred; and
- 12 3. That Otto Trucking then approved Mr. Levandowski's conduct.

13 Approval can be shown through words, or it can be inferred from a person's conduct.
 14 Approval can be inferred if Otto Trucking voluntarily kept the benefit of Mr. Levandowski's
 15 unauthorized misconduct after it learned of it.

16 ⁵⁶ CACI 3710.

17 *[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] is responsible for the harm caused by
 18 [name of agent]'s conduct because [name of defendant] approved that conduct after it
 19 occurred. If you find that [name of agent] harmed [name of plaintiff], you must decide
 whether [name of defendant] approved that conduct. To establish [his/her] claim, [name of
 20 plaintiff] must prove all of the following:*

- 21 1. That *[name of agent]*, although not authorized to do so, purported to act on behalf of
 22 *[name of defendant]*;
- 23 2. That *[name of defendant]* learned of *[name of agent]*'s unauthorized conduct, and all of
 24 the material facts involved in the unauthorized transaction, after it occurred; and
- 25 3. That *[name of defendant]* then approved *[name of agent]*'s conduct.

26 Approval can be shown through words, or it can be inferred from a person's conduct.
 27 *[Approval can be inferred if [name of defendant] voluntarily keeps the benefits of [name of
 28 agent]'s unauthorized conduct after [he/she/it] learns of it.]*

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1 **Disputed Instruction 39 Re. RATIFICATION Offered By Uber/Ottomotto**

2 Uber and Ottomotto contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
3 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 40 Re. CAUSATION: SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR Offered By**

2 **Waymo**

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4 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding

5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 40 Re. CAUSATION: SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR⁵⁷ Offered By**

2 **Defendants**

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4 A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to
5 have contributed to the harm. It must be more than a remote or trivial factor. It does not have to
6 be the only cause of the harm.

7 Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would have occurred
8 without that conduct.

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⁵⁷ CACI, *Guide for Using Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions*, at p. 2
21 (“Substantial Factor: The instructions frequently use the term ‘substantial factor’ to state the
22 element of causation, rather than referring to ‘cause’ and then defining that term in a separate
23 instruction as a ‘substantial factor.’ An instruction that defines ‘substantial factor’ is located in
the Negligence series. The use of the instruction is not intended to be limited to cases involving
negligence.”; CACI 430:

24 **A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to
25 have contributed to the harm. It must be more than a remote or trivial factor. It does not
26 have to be the only cause of the harm.**

27 **[Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would have occurred
28 without that conduct.]**

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 41 Re. BAD FAITH Offered By Waymo**

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3 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 41 Re. BAD FAITH⁵⁸ Offered By Defendants**

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3 If you decide that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking did not misappropriate any of
 4 Waymo's asserted trade secrets, you must then decide whether Waymo made or pursued any
 5 claims in bad faith.

6 “Bad faith” means that a claim of misappropriation superficially appears to have merit but
 7 there is no evidence to support the claim, and Waymo possessed “subjective bad faith.” There is
 8 rarely direct evidence of subjective bad faith. Instead, you may infer that Waymo possessed
 9 subjective bad faith if the shortcomings of a claim were identified prior to or during the course of
 10 the case and Waymo decided to go forward with the claim despite being unable to respond to the
 11 shortcomings; if Waymo abandoned a claim; or if Waymo intended to cause unnecessary delay,
 12 made or pursued a claim to harass, or harbored other improper motives in making or pursuing a
 13 claim. You may also infer Waymo possessed subjective bad faith as a result of its conduct in the
 14 case.

15 In deciding whether Waymo made or pursued a claim of misappropriation in bad faith, you
 16 may not consider whether Waymo's mere suspicion that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking
 17 misused or might misuse information that Waymo alleged was a trade secret in its Amended
 18 Complaint.

24 ⁵⁸ Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.4 (“If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, ... or willful and
 25 malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to
 26 the prevailing party.”); *see also GSI Tech., Inc. v. United Memories, Inc.*, No. 5:13-cv-01081-
 27 PSG, 2016 WL 3035699, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2016) (rejecting plaintiff's arguments “that
 28 the court committed prejudicial error by not trying bad faith separately”; court “ruled that the bad
 faith contention [under § 3426.4] would be presented to the jury”)

Stipulated Instruction No. 42 Re. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE—INFORMATION WAS**READILY ASCERTAINABLE BY PROPER MEANS⁵⁹**

Uber did not misappropriate Waymo's trade secrets if Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking proves that the information was readily ascertainable by proper means at the time of the alleged acquisition or use.

There is no fixed standard for determining what is "readily ascertainable by proper means." In general, information is readily ascertainable if it can be obtained, discovered, developed, or compiled without significant difficulty, effort, or expense. For example, information is readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, reference books, or published materials. On the other hand, the more difficult information is to obtain, and the more time and resources that must be expended in gathering it, the less likely it is that the information is readily ascertainable by proper means.

⁵⁹ CACI 4420:

[Name of defendant] did not misappropriate [name of plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] if [name of defendant] proves that the [select short term to describe, e.g., information] [was/were] readily ascertainable by proper means at the time of the alleged [acquisition/use/ [or] disclosure].

There is no fixed standard for determining what is "readily ascertainable by proper means." In general, information is readily ascertainable if it can be obtained, discovered, developed, or compiled without significant difficulty, effort, or expense. For example, information is readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, reference books, or published materials. On the other hand, the more difficult information is to obtain, and the more time and resources that must be expended in gathering it, the less likely it is that the information is readily ascertainable by proper means.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 43 Re. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE -- MITIGATION OF**
2 **DAMAGES Offered By Waymo**

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4 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 43 Re. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE -- MITIGATION OF**
2 **DAMAGES⁶⁰ Offered By Defendants**

3
4 If Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking misappropriated trade secrets and the
5 misappropriation caused harm, Waymo is not entitled to recover damages for harm that Uber
6 proves Waymo could have avoided the harm with reasonable efforts or expenditures. You may
7 consider the timing of the lawsuit in connection with deciding whether Waymo mitigated its
8 damages.

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⁶⁰ CACI 358

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 44 Re. OUTSIDE REVERSE VEIL PIERCING Offered By**
2 **Waymo and Uber**

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4 Waymo and Uber contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 44 Re. OUTSIDE REVERSE VEIL PIERCING⁶¹ Offered By**

2 **Otto Trucking**

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4 Waymo has filed a lawsuit against Otto Trucking. Under California law, a business
5 entity is usually not held liable for the conduct of its members, managers, officers, beneficial
6 owners, trustees, or other related business entities. However, under the doctrine of “reverse veil
7 piercing”, a business entity may be held liable for the conduct of its members, managers,
8 officers, beneficial owners, trustees, or other related entities.

9 To hold Otto Trucking liable for Mr. Levandowski’s conduct, you must prove both of the
10 following:

- 11 1. Waymo has no alternative adequate remedies; and
12 2. No innocent shareholders would be harmed by the piercing

27

⁶¹ *Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 1510 (2008)

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 45 Re. DAMAGES UNDER CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL**

2 **LAW Offered By Waymo**

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4 As I have described, Waymo has brought claims for trade secret misappropriation under
5 both California and Federal law.

6 Waymo is entitled to damages under either California or Federal law but will not recover
7 damages under both theories.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 45 Re. DAMAGES UNDER CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL**

2 **LAW Offered By Defendants**

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4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 46 Re. REMEDIES FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE**

2 **SECRET⁶² Offered By Waymo**

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4 If Waymo proves that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking misappropriated any of its
5 trade secrets under either California or Federal law, then Waymo is entitled to recover damages if
6 the misappropriation caused Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking to be unjustly enriched.

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12 ⁶² CACI 4409.

13 **If [name of plaintiff] proves that [name of defendant] misappropriated [his/her/its] trade**
14 **secret[s], then [name of plaintiff] is entitled to recover damages if the misappropriation**
15 **caused [[name of plaintiff] to suffer an actual loss/ [or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly**
16 **enriched]. [If [name of defendant]'s misappropriation did not cause [[name of plaintiff] to**
17 **suffer an actual loss/ [or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly enriched], [name of plaintiff]**
18 **may still be entitled to a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use**
19 **could have been prohibited. However, I will calculate the amount of any royalty.]**

20 (B) award--
21 (i)(I) damages for actual loss caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret; and
22 (ii) damages for any unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret
23 that is not addressed in computing damages for actual loss; or
24 (ii) in lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by the
25 misappropriation measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for the
26 misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of the trade secret;

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 46 Re. REMEDIES FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE**

2 **SECRET⁶³ Offered By Defendants**

3
4 If Waymo proves that Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking misappropriated its trade secrets,
5 then Waymo is entitled to recover damages if the misappropriation was a substantial factor in
6 causing Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking to be unjustly enriched. In this case the type of
7 damages that Waymo is seeking is called unjust enrichment.

8 If there was misappropriation but it did not cause Uber, Ottomotto, or Otto Trucking to be
9 unjustly enriched, Waymo may still be entitled to a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period
10 of time the use could have been prohibited. However, I will calculate the amount of any royalty.

21

⁶³ CACI 4409.

22 **If [name of plaintiff] proves that [name of defendant] misappropriated [his/her/its] trade
23 secret[s], then [name of plaintiff] is entitled to recover damages if the misappropriation
24 caused [[name of plaintiff] to suffer an actual loss/ [or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly
enriched].**

25 **[If [name of defendant]'s misappropriation did not cause [[name of plaintiff] to suffer an
actual loss/ [or] [name of defendant] to be unjustly enriched], [name of plaintiff] may still be
26 entitled to a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use could have
been prohibited. However, I will calculate the amount of any royalty.]**

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 47 Re. UNJUST ENRICHMENT⁶⁴ Offered By Waymo**

2
3 Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking were unjustly enriched if its misappropriation of
4 Waymo's trade secrets caused Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking to receive a benefit that they
5 otherwise would not have achieved.

6 To decide the amount of any unjust enrichment, you must determine the value of Uber,
7 Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking's benefit that would not have been achieved except for its
8 misappropriation.

9 Your award must be based upon evidence, and not upon speculation, guesswork or
10 conjecture.⁶⁵

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15 ⁶⁴ CACI 4410.

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18 *[Name of defendant] was unjustly enriched if [his/her/its] misappropriation of [name of*
19 *plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] caused [name of defendant] to receive a benefit that [he/she/it]*
otherwise would not have achieved.

20 *To decide the amount of any unjust enrichment, first determine the value of [name of*
21 *defendant]'s benefit that would not have been achieved except for [his/her/its]*
22 *misappropriation. Then subtract from that amount [name of defendant]'s reasonable*
23 *expenses[, including the value of the [specify categories of expenses in evidence, such as*
24 *labor, materials, rents, interest on invested capital]]. [In calculating the amount of any unjust*
25 *enrichment, do not take into account any amount that you included in determining any*
26 *amount of damages for [name of plaintiff]'s actual loss.]*

27
28 ⁶⁵ Instruction in *O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.*, 2000 WL 35634755
(N.D. Cal. 2000); MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT §5.1.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 47 Re. UNJUST ENRICHMENT⁶⁶ Offered By Defendants**

2

3 If you decide there was misappropriation, Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking were
 4 unjustly enriched if their misappropriation of Waymo's trade secrets caused them to receive a
 5 benefit that they otherwise would not have achieved.

6 To decide the amount of any unjust enrichment, first determine the value of the defendants'
 7 benefit that would not have been achieved except for its misappropriation. Then subtract from that
 8 amount the defendants' reasonable expenses, including the value of their own research and
 9 development.

10 Your award must be based upon evidence, and not upon speculation, guesswork or
 11 conjecture.⁶⁷

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15 ⁶⁶ CACI 4410.

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18 [Name of defendant] was unjustly enriched if [his/her/its] misappropriation of [name of
 19 plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] caused [name of defendant] to receive a benefit that [he/she/it]
 otherwise would not have achieved.

20 To decide the amount of any unjust enrichment, first determine the value of [name of
 21 defendant]'s benefit that would not have been achieved except for [his/her/its]
 22 misappropriation. Then subtract from that amount [name of defendant]'s reasonable
 23 expenses[, including the value of the [specify categories of expenses in evidence, such as
 24 labor, materials, rents, interest on invested capital]]. [In calculating the amount of any unjust
 25 enrichment, do not take into account any amount that you included in determining any
 26 amount of damages for [name of plaintiff]'s actual loss.]

27 ⁶⁷ Instruction in *O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc.*, No. C 00-4071 CW, 2000
 WL 35634755 (N.D. Cal. 2000); MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
 THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 5.1.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 48 Re. REASONABLE ROYALTY – ENTITLEMENT⁶⁸ Offered**

2 **By Waymo**

3
4 Under California and Federal law, Waymo may recover the damages caused by the
5 misappropriation measured by imposition of a reasonable royalty for the misappropriator's
6 unauthorized acquisition or use of the trade secret.

7 Waymo will not recover damages for both unjust enrichment and a reasonable royalty.
8 However, if you find Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking liable for trade secret
9 misappropriation, you should determine reasonable royalty damages in addition to your
10 determination of unjust enrichment damages.

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14⁶⁸ Model Patent Jury Instructions for the Northern District of California 5.6

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16 **If [patent holder] has not proved its claim for lost profits, or has proved its claim for lost**
17 **profits for only a portion of the infringing sales, then [patent holder] should be awarded a**
18 **reasonable royalty for all infringing sales for which it has not been awarded lost profits**
damages.

19
20 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836.

21 **(B) award--**

- 22 **(i)(I) damages for actual loss caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret; and**
23
(II) damages for any unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret
24 **that is not addressed in computing damages for actual loss; or**
25
(ii) in lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by the
26 **misappropriation measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for the**
27 **misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of the trade secret;**

Disputed Instruction No. 48 Re. REASONABLE ROYALTY – ENTITLEMENT Offered

By Defendants⁶⁹

Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding memorandum of law).

⁶⁹ Model Patent Jury Instructions for the Northern District of California 5.6.

If [patent holder] has not proved its claim for lost profits, or has proved its claim for lost profits for only a portion of the infringing sales, then [patent holder] should be awarded a reasonable royalty for all infringing sales for which it has not been awarded lost profits damages.

18 U.S.C. § 1836.

(b)(3) Remedies.—In a civil action brought under this subsection with respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may--

(B) award--

(i) damages for actual loss caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret; and

(II) damages for any unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret that is not addressed in computing damages for actual loss; or

(ii) in lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by the misappropriation measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for the misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of the trade secret;

CACI 4409, Directions For Use –Stating that under California Uniform Trade Secret Act, “[b]oth the statute and case law indicate that the question of a reasonable royalty should not be presented to the jury.”

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 49 Re. REASONABLE ROYALTY – DEFINITION⁷⁰ Offered By**

2 **Waymo**

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6 ⁷⁰ Model Patent Jury Instructions for the Northern District of California 5.7

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8 A royalty is a payment made to a patent holder in exchange for the right to make, use or sell
9 the claimed invention. This right is called a “license.” A reasonable royalty is the payment
10 for the license that would have resulted from a hypothetical negotiation between the patent
holder and the infringer taking place at the time when the infringing activity first began. In
11 considering the nature of this negotiation, you must assume that the patent holder and the
infringer would have acted reasonably and would have entered into a license agreement.
12 You must also assume that both parties believed the patent was valid and infringed. Your
13 role is to determine what the result of that negotiation would have been. The test for damages
14 is what royalty would have resulted from the hypothetical negotiation and not simply what
either party would have preferred.

15

16 A royalty can be calculated in several different ways and it is for you to determine which
17 way is the most appropriate based on the evidence you have heard. One way to calculate a
18 royalty is to determine what is called an “ongoing royalty.” To calculate an ongoing royalty,
you must first determine the “base,” that is, the product on which the infringer is to pay.
19 You then need to multiply the revenue the defendant obtained from that base by the “rate”
or percentage that you find would have resulted from the hypothetical negotiation. For
example, if the patent covers a nail, and the nail sells for \$1, and the licensee sold 200 nails,
20 the base revenue would be \$200. If the rate you find would have resulted from the
hypothetical negotiation is 1%, then the royalty would be \$2, or the rate of 0.01 times the
base revenue of \$200. By contrast, if you find the rate to be 5%, the royalty would be \$10,
21 or the rate of 0.05 times the base revenue of \$200. These numbers are only examples, and
22 are not intended to suggest the appropriate royalty rate.

23

24 Instead of a percentage royalty, you may decide that the appropriate royalty that would have
25 resulted from a hypothetical negotiation is a fixed number of dollars per unit sold. If you do,
26 the royalty would be that fixed number of dollars times the number of units sold.

1 A royalty is a payment made in exchange for the right to use the claimed trade secrets.
2

3 This right is called a “license.” A reasonable royalty is the payment for the license that would have
4 resulted from a hypothetical negotiation between the owner of the trade secret and the

5 **If the patent covers only part of the product that the infringer sells, then the base would
6 normally be only that feature or component. For example, if you find that for a \$100 car,
7 the patented feature is the tires which sell for \$5, the base revenue would be \$5.**

8 [However, in a circumstance in which the patented feature is the reason customers buy the
9 whole product, the base revenue may be the value of the whole product.]⁷⁰

10 [In this case the [] patent covers only one component of the product that [alleged infringer]
11 uses or sells. It is [patent holder]’s burden to demonstrate what value that component has
12 added to the desirability of the product as a whole and to separate the value of the patented
13 contribution from the value of other parts of the product that are not attributable to the
14 patented invention.]

15 [In this case, [patent holder] [accused infringer] has introduced evidence of licenses
16 between [licensees] and [licensors]. The royalty rate in one or more of those licenses may
17 be considered if it helps to establish the value that is attributable to the patented invention
18 as distinct from the value of other features of [alleged infringer’s] product.]⁷⁰

19 The ultimate combination of royalty base and royalty rate must reflect the value
20 attributable to the infringing features of the product, and no more. When the accused
21 infringing products have both patented and unpatented features, measuring this value
22 requires you to identify and award only the value of the patented features.

23 Another way to calculate a royalty is to determine a one-time lump sum payment that the
24 infringer would have paid at the time of the hypothetical negotiation for a license covering
25 all sales of the licensed product, both past and future. This differs from payment of an
26 ongoing royalty because, with an ongoing royalty, the licensee pays based on the revenue of
27 actual licensed products it sells. When a one-time lump sum is paid, the infringer pays a
28 single price for a license covering both past and future infringing sales.

29
30 **It is up to you, based on the evidence, to decide what type of royalty is appropriate in this
31 case for the life of the patent.**

1 misappropriator taking place at the time when the misappropriation first began. In considering the
2 nature of this negotiation, you must assume that the trade secret owner and the misappropriator
3 would have acted reasonably and would have entered into a license agreement. You must also
4 assume that both parties believed the trade secret owner to be in possession of valid trade secrets.
5 Your role is to determine what the result of that negotiation would have been. The test for damages
6 is what royalty would have resulted from the hypothetical negotiation and not simply what either
7 party would have preferred.

8 Waymo and Uber have both proposed a one-time lump sum payment that the
9 misappropriator would have paid at the time of the hypothetical negotiation for a license covering
10 all use of the claimed trade secrets, both past and future. When a one-time lump sum is paid, the
11 misappropriator pays a single price for a license covering both past and future infringing use.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 49 Re. REASONABLE ROYALTY – DEFINITION Offered By**

2 **Defendants**

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4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding memorandum of
5 law).

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1 Disputed Instruction No. 50 Re. GEORGIA PACIFIC FACTORS⁷¹ Offered By Waymo

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⁷¹ AIPLA's Model Patent Jury Instructions 11.15

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5 **In determining the amount of a reasonable royalty, you may consider evidence on any of the**
6 **following factors, in addition to any other evidence presented by the parties on the economic**
7 **value of the patent:**

- 1 1. Any royalties received by the licensor for the licensing of the patent-in-suit,
2 proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
- 3 2. The rates paid by [the Defendant] to license other patents comparable to the
4 [abbreviated patent number] patent.
- 5 3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive, or as
6 restricted or non-restricted in terms of its territory or with respect to whom
7 the manufactured product may be sold.
- 8 4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain its right
9 to exclude others from using the patented invention by not licensing others to
10 use the invention, or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to
11 preserve that exclusivity.
- 12 5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and the licensee, such as
13 whether or not they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of
14 business.
- 15 6. The effect of selling the patented product in promoting sales of other products
16 of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator
17 of sales of its non-patented items; and the extent of such collateral sales.
- 18 7. The duration of the [abbreviated patent number] patent and the term of the
19 license.
- 20 8. The established profitability of the product made under the [abbreviated
21 patent number] patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.
- 22 9. The utility and advantages of the patented invention over the old modes or
23 devices, if any that had been used for achieving similar results.
- 24 10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
25 embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
26 those who have used the invention.
- 27 11. The extent to which [the Defendant] has made use of the invention; and any
28 evidence that shows the value of that use.
- 29 12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
30 particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
31 invention or analogous inventions.
- 32 13. The portion of the profit that arises from the patented invention itself as
33 opposed to profit arising from unpatented features, such as the manufacturing
34 process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the
35 accused infringer.

In determining the amount of a reasonable royalty, you may consider evidence on any of the following factors, in addition to any other evidence presented by the parties on the economic value of the claimed trade secrets:

1. Any royalties received by the licensor for the licensing of the claimed trade secrets, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the Defendants to license other trade secrets comparable to the claimed trade secrets.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive, or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of its territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain its right to exclude others from using the claimed trade secrets by not licensing others to use the invention, or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that exclusivity.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and the licensee, such as whether or not they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business.

14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.

- 15. The amount that a licensor and a licensee (such as [the Defendant]) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both sides had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a patentee who was willing to grant a license.**
- 16. Any other economic factor that a normally prudent business person would, under similar circumstances, take into consideration in negotiating the hypothetical license.**

- 1 6. The effect of selling products using claimed trade secrets in promoting sales of
2 other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as
3 a generator of sales of its non-trade secret items; and the extent of such collateral
4 sales.
- 5 7. The duration of the claimed trade secrets and the term of the license.
- 6 8. The established profitability of the product made under claimed trade secrets; its
7 commercial success; and its current popularity.
- 8 9. The utility and advantages of the claimed trade secrets over the old modes or
9 devices, if any that had been used for achieving similar results.
- 10 10. The nature of the claimed trade secrets; the character of the commercial
11 embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those
12 who have used the claimed trade secrets.
- 13 11. The extent to which the Defendants have made use of the claimed trade secrets; and
14 any evidence that shows the value of that use.
- 15 12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
16 particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the claimed
17 trade secrets or analogous trade secrets.
- 18 13. The portion of the profit that arises from the claimed trade secrets themselves as
19 opposed to profit arising from non-trade secret features, such as the manufacturing
20 process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the
21 accused infringer.
- 22 14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
- 23 15. The amount that a licensor and a licensee (such as the Defendants) would have
24 agreed upon (at the time the use of the claimed trade secrets began) if both sides
25 had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the
26 amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain
27 a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented

1 invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a
2 reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a licensor who
3 was willing to grant a license.

4 Any other economic factor that a normally prudent business person would, under similar
5 circumstances, take into consideration in negotiating the hypothetical license.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 50 Re. GEORGIA PACIFIC FACTORS Offered By Defendants**

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3 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 51 Re. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL AND**
2 **MALICIOUS MISAPPROPRIATION⁷² Offered By Waymo**

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4 If you find that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking misappropriated Waymo's trade
5 secrets under either California or Federal law and that their conduct was willful and malicious, you
6

7 ⁷² CACI 4411
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10 **If you decide that [name of defendant]'s misappropriation caused [name of plaintiff] harm,
11 you must decide whether that conduct justifies an award of punitive damages. The
12 purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed
13 [name of plaintiff] and to discourage similar conduct in the future.**

14 **In order to recover punitive damages, [name of plaintiff] must prove [by clear and
15 convincing evidence] that [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously. You must
16 determine whether [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously, but you will not be
17 asked to determine the amount of any punitive damages. I will calculate the amount later.**

18 **“Willfully” means that [name of defendant] acted with a purpose or willingness to commit
19 the act or engage in the conduct in question, and the conduct was not reasonable under the
20 circumstances at the time and was not undertaken in good faith.**

21 **“Maliciously” means that [name of defendant] acted with an intent to cause injury, or that
22 [name of defendant]’s conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing
23 disregard for the rights of others.**

24 **“Despicable conduct” is conduct so vile, base, or wretched that it would be looked down on
25 and despised by ordinary decent people. [Name of defendant] acted with knowing disregard
26 if [he/she/it] was aware of the probable consequences of [his/her/its] conduct and
27 deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.**

28 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836.

29 **(C) if the trade secret is willfully and maliciously misappropriated, award exemplary
30 damages in an amount not more than 2 times the amount of the damages awarded under
31 subparagraph (B); and**

1 must determine what amount of exemplary damages Waymo is entitled to recover. Exemplary
2 damages are intended to punish the defendant and deter misappropriation of trade secrets. You
3 may determine an amount of exemplary damages up to two times the amount awarded as actual
4 damages for misappropriation of trade secrets.

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 51 Re. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL AND**
2 **MALICIOUS MISAPPROPRIATION⁷³ Offered By Defendants**

3
4 Defendants contend that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law) but offer this alternative formulation should the Court rule otherwise.

6 If you decide that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking's misappropriation caused
7 Waymo harm, you must decide whether that conduct justifies an award of punitive damages.

9 ⁷³ CACI 4411

10
11 **If you decide that [name of defendant]'s misappropriation caused [name of plaintiff] harm,
12 you must decide whether that conduct justifies an award of punitive damages. The
13 purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed
[name of plaintiff] and to discourage similar conduct in the future.**

14 **In order to recover punitive damages, [name of plaintiff] must prove [by clear and
15 convincing evidence] that [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously. You must
16 determine whether [name of defendant] acted willfully and maliciously, but you will not be
asked to determine the amount of any punitive damages. I will calculate the amount later.**

17 **"Willfully" means that [name of defendant] acted with a purpose or willingness to commit
18 the act or engage in the conduct in question, and the conduct was not reasonable under the
circumstances at the time and was not undertaken in good faith.**

19 **"Maliciously" means that [name of defendant] acted with an intent to cause injury, or that
20 [name of defendant]'s conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing
disregard for the rights of others.**

21 **"Despicable conduct" is conduct so vile, base, or wretched that it would be looked down on
22 and despised by ordinary decent people. [Name of defendant] acted with knowing disregard
23 if [he/she/it] was aware of the probable consequences of [his/her/its] conduct and
deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.**

24
25 18 U.S.C. § 1836.

26 **(b)(3)(C) if the trade secret is willfully and maliciously misappropriated, award exemplary
27 damages in an amount not more than 2 times the amount of the damages awarded under
subparagraph (B); and**

1 The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed
2 Waymo and to discourage similar conduct in the future.

3 In order to recover punitive damages, Waymo must prove by clear and convincing
4 evidence that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted willfully and maliciously. You must
5 determine whether Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted willfully and maliciously, but
6 you will not be asked to determine the amount of any punitive damages. I will calculate that
7 amount later.

9 “Willfully” means that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted with a purpose or
10 willingness to commit the act or engage in the conduct in question, and the conduct was not
11 reasonable under the circumstances at the time and was not undertaken in good faith.
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13 “Maliciously” means that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted with an intent to
14 cause injury, or that Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking’s conduct was despicable and was
15 done with a willing and knowing disregard for the rights of others. “Despicable conduct” is
16 conduct so vile, base, or wretched that it would be looked down on and despised by ordinary
17 decent people. Uber, Ottomotto, and/or Otto Trucking acted with knowing disregard if they
18 were aware of the probable consequences of their conduct and deliberately failed to avoid those
19 consequences.
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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 52 Re. DAMAGES FROM MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS Offered**

2 **By Waymo**

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4 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 52 Re. DAMAGES FROM MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS⁷⁴**

2 **Offered By Defendants**

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4 In this case, Waymo seeks damages from more than one defendant. You must determine
5 the liability of each defendant to Waymo separately.

6 If you determine that more than one defendant is liable to Waymo for damages, you will
7 be asked to find Waymo's total damages and the comparative fault of each defendant.

8 In deciding on the amount of damages, consider only Waymo's claimed losses. Do not
9 attempt to divide the damages among the defendants. The allocation of responsibility for payment
10 of damages among multiple defendants is to be done by the court after you reach your verdict.

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20 ⁷⁴ CACI 3933

21 **In this case, [name of plaintiff] seeks damages from more than one defendant. You must**
22 **determine the liability of each defendant to [name of plaintiff] separately.**

23 **If you determine that more than one defendant is liable to [name of plaintiff] for damages,**
24 **you will be asked to fin [name of plaintiff]'s total damages [and the comparative fault of**
25 **[[name of plaintiff]/each defendant/ [and] other nonparties]].**

26 **In deciding on the amount of damages, consider only [name of plaintiff]'s claimed losses.**
27 **Do not attempt to divide the damages [between/among] the defendants. The allocation of**
28 **responsibility for payment of damages among multiple defendants is to be done by the**
court after you reach your verdict.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 53 Re. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE—UNCLEAN HANDS**

2 **Offered By Waymo**

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4 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
5 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 53 Re. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE—UNCLEAN HANDS⁷⁵**

2 **Offered By Otto Trucking**

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4 Otto Trucking claims as a defense that Waymo's misconduct precludes its enforcement of
5 Waymo's claims. To establish this defense, Otto Trucking must prove that Waymo's conduct was
6 unconscionable and resulted in prejudice to Otto Trucking.

7
8 Waymo's misconduct must be intimately connected with Waymo's claims and of such a
9 prejudicial nature that it would unfair to allow Waymo to rely on its claim.

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⁷⁵ Final Jury Instructions, *GSI Techs. Inc. v. United Memories Inc., et al.*, No. 5:13-cv-01081-
27 PSG (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2015), Dkt. No. 1039 at 54.

1 **Disputed Instruction No. 54 Re. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES Offered By Waymo**

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3 Waymo contends that no such instruction should be given (see corresponding
4 memorandum of law).

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1 **Disputed Instruction No. 54 Re. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES⁷⁶ Offered By**
 2 Defendants

3 Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking were unjustly enriched if their misappropriation of
 4 Waymo's trade secrets caused them to receive a benefit that they otherwise would not have
 5 achieved. To decide the amount of any unjust enrichment, first determine the value of the
 6 defendants' benefit that would not have been achieved except for its misappropriation. Then
 7 subtract from that amount the defendants' reasonable expenses, including the value of their own
 8 research and development.⁷⁷

9 An important and related concept is apportionment. In determining the amount of unjust
 10 enrichment, you must only award the amount of the benefit attributable to the specific trade
 11 secret(s), if any, that you find was misappropriated. A benefit to a defendant that is attributable
 12 to a trade secret that you have found was not misappropriated, for example, must be excluded
 13 from your calculation of unjust enrichment. The owner of the trade secrets has the burden to
 14 persuade you of the amount of its damages. You should award only those damages that the
 15 owner more likely than not suffered. While a trade secret owner is not required to prove its
 16 damages with mathematical precision, it must prove them with reasonable certainty. A trade
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18 ⁷⁶ *02 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.*, 399 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1076-77 (N.D.
 19 Cal. November 10, 2005); *W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. GI Dynamics, Inc.*, 872 F.Supp.2d
 20 883, 892-93 (D. Az. May 30, 2012)

77 CACI 4410

21 [Name of defendant] was unjustly enriched if [his/her/its] misappropriation of [name of
 22 plaintiff]'s trade secret[s] caused [name of defendant] to receive a benefit that [he/she/it]
 23 otherwise would not have achieved.

24 To decide the amount of any unjust enrichment, first determine the value of [name of
 25 defendant]'s benefit that would not have been achieved except for [his/her/its]
 26 misappropriation. Then subtract from that amount [name of defendant]'s reasonable
 27 expenses[, including the value of the [specify categories of expenses in evidence, such as labor,
 materials, rents, interest on invested capital]]. [In calculating the amount of any unjust
 enrichment, do not take into account any amount that you included in determining any
 amount of damages for [name of plaintiff]'s actual loss.]

1 secret owner is not entitled to damages that are remote or speculative. The damages award
2 should be based on sound economic proof.

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